Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/2
8 April 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

First session
New York, 7 to 18 April 1997

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATIONS OF FRANCE, CHINA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT AT THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

The delegations of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, in the particular context of the commencement of the strengthened review process agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reiterate our countries' strong and continuing support for the Treaty. We express our determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the Treaty, including those of article VI.

Stressing the importance of the indefinite extension of the Treaty, we reaffirm our continued support for the documents adopted by consensus on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.[1]

We welcome the fact that Andorra, Angola, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, the United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu and Oman have acceded to the Treaty since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. We stress the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty which would contribute to the enhancement of both regional and global security.

* * *

Since the May 1995 Review and Extension Conference, there have been very significant developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, notably with respect to the programme of action set out in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament:[2]

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 is a step that has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community.

The signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by more than 140 States, including the 5 nuclear-weapon States that signed on the first day of its opening for signature on 24 September 1996, is a historic event.

By banning any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, the Treaty, as stated in its preamble, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.

This is why China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States value this Treaty. We are pleased to see that, in such a short period of time since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, this major achievement, followed by the successful creation of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty took place.

We stress the importance of early signature and ratification of the Treaty by all States which would facilitate its early entry into force; this is an objective we fully share.

(b) We also reaffirm our readiness for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a goal contained in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and as its second step, following the completion of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Such a treaty will cap the fissile material stockpiles available for use in nuclear weapons and, by adding new constraints, will strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and will constitute a significant step towards the eventual achievement of nuclear disarmament.

We encourage all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil this shared commitment set forth in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We also stress the importance for the States which are not yet parties to the Treaty to join the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

(c) It is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States underscore the important and tangible progress achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament and reaffirm our determination to continue the pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

In this context we welcome the recent understanding reached by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States at Helsinki on further reductions of nuclear weapons building on progress already achieved.

The other steps being taken by us in this area are also to be welcomed.

We also welcome the removal of all nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the territories of Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine.

(d) China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States reaffirm our conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.

We consider that the signature by all the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the South Pacific and in Africa, was a significant development. By signing these protocols, all the nuclear-weapon States are giving security assurances in treaty form to the very large number of States concerned.

Moreover, we remain ready to work with the signatories of the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to remove those obstacles currently preventing the nuclear-weapon States from signing the Protocol to that Treaty.

These steps are in line with the security assurances we have provided in our national declarations, which are referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and constitute a positive development with regard to the relevant paragraph of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

* * *

We are ready to contribute to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives by doing our part in support of the programme for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. In this regard, we intend to apply those measures provided for in the model protocol that each of us identifies as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that State, and as consistent with that State's obligations under article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States attach importance to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty. In this context we reaffirm our commitment towards cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and following the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Notes

[1] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)).

[2] Ibid., decision 2.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3
10 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER ONE: ARTICLE VI

Submitted by New Zealand

Proposed elements for inclusion in the report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

Note. New Zealand will, over the course of the preparatory process, be looking to achieve consensus formulations that cover the ideas in the following proposals, some of which have already been advanced by other States parties. Those with an asterisk may be suitable for development during the course of the first session of the Preparatory Committee as positions on which all States parties can now agree.

Article VI. Principles and objectives

Paragraph 4 (a), Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

* States parties welcome the adoption and signature by more than 140 countries of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and underline their commitment to strictly observe its provisions pending entry into force. States parties not yet party to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty undertake to join this Treaty. States parties further agree to pursue all possible measures consistent with international law to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.

Paragraph 4 (b), Cut-off

* States parties continue to attach high priority to negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. States parties agree to consider what further steps might be taken to enable these negotiations to begin promptly.

Paragraph 4 (c), Nuclear disarmament

The nuclear-weapon States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, and undertake to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament

in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States parties declare unequivocally their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start immediately on the practical first steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

Nuclear-weapon States agree to pursue with determination the elimination of nuclear weapons through all available channels, including in bilateral negotiations and in negotiations among all five nuclear-weapon States.

* States parties agree that the Conference on Disarmament, the international community's standing body for disarmament negotiations, is mandated to pursue all items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for multilateral dialogue and the negotiation of further steps, as appropriate, which contribute to the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/4
10 April 1997

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CLUSTER ONE

Submitted by Canada

UNIVERSALITY

We welcome the recent accessions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which strengthen it and reaffirm the urgency of universal adherence.

We invite all States not yet party to the Treaty to review and revisit their positions, especially in view of the now near universal adherence to the Treaty.

START II, III AND BEYOND

We welcome the joint statement by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki on 21 March 1997 committing to the commencement of negotiations on a START III agreement, immediately once START II enters into force, which would establish, by 31 December 2007, lower aggregate levels of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads, possible reductions in tactical nuclear systems and other measures to promote the irreversibility of these deep reductions.

State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expect these commitments to be realized as soon as possible.

We call upon other nuclear-weapon States to commit immediately to not increasing their inventories and to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations among the five, in parallel with START III.

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

We call on all States to make the utmost efforts to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, through all means possible up to and including the Conference of the States Parties to be held in 1999.

We emphasize that article 5 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referring to peaceful nuclear explosions, has been redefined and overtaken under the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

We recognize the decisive role that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty plays in preventing the development of new nuclear weapons and the modernization of existing ones. We look to the nuclear-weapon States to signal their unequivocal support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force, by declaring their intention never again to conduct nuclear explosions.

FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF CONVENTION

We look to the earliest possible commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament towards a fissile material cut-off convention, on the basis of the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

Pending conclusion of such a convention, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to affirm or reaffirm, as the case may be, their commitment to forever cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Determined efforts should be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and to place more of such material under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

SECURITY ASSURANCES

Further steps should be taken to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We welcome and will actively explore ideas in this respect, including those aimed at an internationally legally binding instrument.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/5
10 April 1997

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New York, 7-18 April 1997

RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST ADOPTED BY THE 1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Submitted by Egypt*

1. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted a package consisting of three decisions and a resolution on the Middle East.[1]

2. The adoption of a resolution on the Middle East and the fact that it was the only resolution by the Conference concerning a specific region is a clear expression by the States parties of their concern over the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East resulting from the existence of ambiguous nuclear policies and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in the region endangering regional and international peace and security.

3. As the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons starts its first session, and in order to achieve the universality of the Treaty, there is an urgent need to assess the situation in the Middle East in the light of the aforementioned with a view to adopting recommendations by the Preparatory Committee pertaining to ways and means to ensure the full implementation of the provisions of the resolution.

4. Since May 1995, some specific positive developments have taken place and should be taken into consideration, these are:

(a) All States of the Middle East have become parties to the Treaty except Israel, the only State in the region that is not a party to the Treaty and that has not declared its intention to do so;

(b) The continued adoption by consensus, for the seventeenth year in a row, of a resolution by the General Assembly calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

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* On behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(c) The widespread support for resolution 51/48 of 10 December 1996 adopted by the General Assembly at its fifty-first session on agenda item 74, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" calling upon Israel, the only State in the Middle East that is not yet party to the Treaty and has not declared its intention to do so, to accede to the Treaty without further delay, and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This support reflects the increased concern of the international community resulting from the fact that Israel is defying the repeated calls to join the Treaty;

(d) The readiness demonstrated by Arab States to take practical steps towards the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective in accordance with paragraph 5 of the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.[1] On the other hand, Israel continues to prevent and avoid any discussion on this issue in all relevant forums, particularly at the regional level.

5. Any assessment based on these considerations will lead only to one conclusion, namely that all Arab States are complying with the provisions of the Treaty as well as with the letter and spirit of the resolution, while Israel continues to defy those repeated calls by refusing to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

6. It is therefore imperative that the Preparatory Committee address this important issue with a view to correcting the existing imbalance between the compliance by all Arab States with their obligations in accordance with the Treaty and the resolution on the Middle East on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the risk imposed by Israel's ambiguous nuclear policies and its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to the whole region of the Middle East.

7. All States parties to the Treaty, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, have a responsibility to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts to achieve the full implementation of the resolution. The role of the depository States in shouldering their primary responsibilities as co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East is crucial in implementing the resolution.

Notes

[1] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/6
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LETTER RECEIVED ON 10 APRIL 1997 FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TRANSMITTING THE JOINT STATEMENTS FROM THE MARCH 1997 SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, HELD AT HELSINKI

We would like to share with you the attached joint statements from the March 1997 summit meeting between the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation held at Helsinki. These statements, which address parameters on future reduction in nuclear forces, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and European security, are relevant to the work of the Preparatory Committee now under way. We request that you circulate the text of the present letter and its annexes as an official document of the Committee.

(Signed) Lawrence SCHEINMAN
For the United States of America

(Signed) Serguei I. KISLYAK
For the Russian Federation

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ANNEX I

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT
JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region. They reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the U.S.-Russian relationship in recent years.

Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security. The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated Europe. This evolution should be based on a broad commitment to the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.

The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE, whose potential has yet to be fully realized, meets the interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions, both to define further the goals of security cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.

They underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and equal participation of all states. The rule of consensus should remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decision-making. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the ongoing OSCE effort to develop a model for security in Europe which takes account of the radically changed situation on the eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE's essential role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be actively pursued.

In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special attention to the question of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They further agreed that the NATO-Russia relationship, as defined in this document, should provide for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern.

The Presidents noted that the NATO-Russia document would reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that enhances mutual security.

The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in establishing the trust necessary to build a common security space on the continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to continue to preclude any destabilizing build-up of forces in different regions of Europe.

The Presidents stressed the importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to concluding by late spring or early summer of 1997 a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind.

President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document. President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a reference in the document.

The Presidents agreed that the United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face many common security challenges that can best be addressed through cooperation among all the states of the Euro-Atlantic area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to improve the effectiveness of European security institutions, including by concluding the agreements and arrangements outlined in this statement.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
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FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
/S/

Helsinki

March 21, 1997

ANNEX II

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

The Presidents reaffirm the principles of their May 10, 1995 Joint Statement, which will serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, including:

-- The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

-- Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

-- Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

-- Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

-- The scale of deployment -- in number and geographic scope -- of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the Parties that their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the Parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence.

The efforts undertaken by the Parties in this regard are reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States and Russia issued on September 28, 1994, as well as in that of May 10, 1995. Important decisions were made at the United States-Russia summit meeting on April 23, 1996.

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In order to fulfill one of the primary obligations under the ABM Treaty -- the obligation not to give non-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test them in an ABM mode -- the Presidents have instructed their respective delegations to complete the preparation of an agreement to ensure fulfillment of this requirement.

In Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on the problem of demarcation between TMD systems and ABM systems, the United States and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, successfully finished negotiations on demarcation with respect to lower-velocity TMD systems. The Presidents note that agreements were also reached in 1996 with respect to confidence-building measures and ABM Treaty succession. The Presidents have instructed their experts to complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher-velocity TMD systems.

Neither side has plans before April 1999 to flight test, against a ballistic target missile, TMD interceptor missiles subject to the agreement on demarcation with respect to higher velocity TMD systems. Neither side has plans for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems. Neither side has plans to test TMD systems against target missiles with MIRVs or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

The elements for the agreement on higher-velocity TMD systems are:

The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec.

The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 3500 km.

The sides will not develop, test, or deploy space-based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents noted that TMD technology is in its early stages and continues to evolve. They agreed that developing effective TMD while maintaining a viable ABM Treaty will require continued consultations. To this end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities, including matters related to the agreement to be completed on higher-velocity systems, which will be based on this joint statement by the two Presidents, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. These consultations will be facilitated by the agreed detailed annual information exchange on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater missile defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, inter alia, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

In resolving the tasks facing them, the Parties will act in a spirit of cooperation, mutual openness, and commitment to the ABM Treaty.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
/S/

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
/S/

Helsinki

March 21, 1997

ANNEX III

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT ON PARAMETERS ON FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The START I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are nuclear-weapon free. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.

Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.

Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
/S/

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
/S/

Helsinki

March 21, 1997